AP Microeconomics, Unit 4
Exam words: Imperfect Competition
The 28 words a written answer in this unit needs. For each one: what it means, a wording that loses the mark and why, and a sentence that uses it the way a full answer would.
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The words
monopoly
A market with one seller of a product with no close substitutes, behind entry barriers.
Loses the mark: “a monopoly charges whatever it wants”. A monopoly still faces the market demand curve; a higher price means fewer sales.
Example: The only ferry company serving the remote town is a monopoly, so it faces the whole downward-sloping market demand for crossings.
barriers to entry
Obstacles such as key resource control, patents, licenses or economies of scale that block entry.
Loses the mark: “entry competes away the monopoly's profit”. Barriers to entry keep rivals out, so a monopoly's profit can last in the long run.
Example: A 20-year patent is a barrier to entry that lets the drug maker keep its economic profit for years.
price maker
A firm facing downward-sloping demand, so it sets its price by choosing quantity.
Loses the mark: “the monopoly picks any price and quantity it likes”. Once it chooses a quantity, the demand curve sets the highest price it can charge.
Example: As a price maker, the ferry company can sell more crossings only by lowering its fare.
marginal revenue is less than price
A single-price seller must cut the price on all units to sell more.
Loses the mark: “marginal revenue equals the price for a monopoly”. Lowering the price to sell one more unit also lowers it on every other unit, so MR is below price.
Example: Cutting the fare from 10 to 9 dollars raises crossings from 50 to 51, so marginal revenue is less than price: 459 minus 500 is negative 41 dollars.
elastic range of demand
The upper part of a straight-line demand curve, where MR is positive; monopolies produce here.
Loses the mark: “the monopoly sells where demand is inelastic”. Where demand is inelastic MR is negative, so cutting output would raise revenue and cut cost.
Example: The ferry company produces in the elastic range of demand, since a further fare cut there would still raise revenue.
monopoly price
The price on the demand curve at the quantity where MR = MC.
Loses the mark: “the price is where MR meets MC”. MR = MC gives the quantity; the price is found by going up to the demand curve.
Example: At 400 crossings, where MR = MC, the demand curve shows a monopoly price of 15 dollars, well above the 5 dollar marginal cost.
deadweight loss of monopoly
Total surplus lost because a monopoly produces less than where demand meets marginal cost.
Loses the mark: “the monopoly's profit is the deadweight loss”. Profit taken from buyers is a transfer; the deadweight loss is surplus nobody gets.
Example: The deadweight loss of monopoly is the triangle between demand and MC from 400 to 600 crossings, trips worth more than their cost that never run.
allocatively inefficient
Output where price exceeds marginal cost, so units buyers value above cost are not made.
Loses the mark: “a monopoly is inefficient because it makes a profit”. The inefficiency is the restricted quantity where P > MC, not the profit itself.
Example: The ferry monopoly is allocatively inefficient because its 15 dollar price is above the 5 dollar marginal cost of one more crossing.
price discrimination
Charging different buyers different prices for the same good, for reasons other than cost differences.
Loses the mark: “charging more because it costs more to serve them”. A price gap that matches a cost gap is not price discrimination.
Example: The museum practices price discrimination by charging students 8 dollars and other adults 20 for the same visit.
conditions for price discrimination
Market power, a way to sort buyers by willingness to pay, and no resale.
Loses the mark: “any firm can charge different prices”. A price taker has no power over price, and resale would undo the price gap.
Example: The museum meets the conditions for price discrimination: it has no close rival, checks student cards, and tickets cannot be resold at the door.
perfect price discrimination
Charging each buyer exactly their willingness to pay: output is efficient, consumer surplus zero.
Loses the mark: “buyers keep their consumer surplus”. Each buyer pays their full willingness to pay, so the seller captures all the surplus.
Example: Under perfect price discrimination, the tutor charges each family its top price, teaches every lesson worth more than its cost, and keeps all the surplus.
natural monopoly
Average total cost falls across all market demand, so one firm supplies most cheaply.
Loses the mark: “a natural monopoly is one protected by law”. A natural monopoly arises from costs, not from legal protection.
Example: The town's water system is a natural monopoly: a second set of pipes would double the fixed cost for the same customers.
fair-return price
A regulated price where demand meets ATC, so a natural monopoly earns zero economic profit.
Loses the mark: “the fair-return price is the efficient price”. At P = ATC price is still above marginal cost, so some deadweight loss remains.
Example: The commission sets a fair-return price of 30 dollars a month, where demand meets ATC, so the water company just covers its costs.
socially optimal price
A regulated price where demand meets marginal cost; efficient but below ATC, needing a subsidy.
Loses the mark: “price equal to marginal cost covers the firm's costs”. With ATC falling, MC is below ATC, so P = MC leaves the firm with a loss.
Example: At the socially optimal price of 18 dollars the water company loses money on every bill, so the town must subsidize it.
monopolistic competition
A market with many firms selling differentiated products, with easy long-run entry and exit.
Loses the mark: “monopolistic competition is a few big firms”. A few big firms is oligopoly; monopolistic competition has many small ones.
Example: The town's hair salons are in monopolistic competition: there are many of them, each with its own style and location.
product differentiation
Making a product distinct from rivals' by quality, style, location or branding, giving downward-sloping demand.
Loses the mark: “a unique product protects profit in the long run”. Entry of close imitators shrinks each firm's demand until profit is zero.
Example: Product differentiation through a loyalty app and a corner location lets one coffee bar charge 30 cents more than the cafe down the street.
demand tangent to ATC
Each firm's demand touches its ATC at its chosen output, so economic profit is zero.
Loses the mark: “the tangency is at the bottom of ATC”. Demand slopes down, so it touches ATC on the falling part, to the left of the minimum.
Example: After new salons open, each salon's demand curve is tangent to the ATC curve at 300 cuts a month, where price equals average total cost.
excess capacity
The gap between a firm's long-run output and the larger output at minimum ATC.
Loses the mark: “excess capacity means unsold goods”. Excess capacity is output the firm could make more cheaply, not inventory left on shelves.
Example: Each salon has excess capacity: it does 300 cuts a month though its ATC would be lowest at 450.
payoff matrix
A table showing each player's payoff for every combination of the players' strategies.
Loses the mark: “only the equilibrium cell matters”. Best responses are found by comparing payoffs across cells, so every cell is needed.
Example: The payoff matrix shows that if both stores cut prices, each earns 4,000 dollars a week.
dominant strategy
A strategy giving a player a higher payoff than any other, whatever the other chooses.
Loses the mark: “the strategy with the best outcome”. A dominant strategy is best against each rival choice; it need not reach the best cell in the table.
Example: Cutting prices is Store A's dominant strategy, since it pays more whether Store B cuts or holds its price.
Nash equilibrium
Strategies where each player's choice is the best response to the other's.
Loses the mark: “the Nash equilibrium is the outcome best for both players”. Both may do better elsewhere in the table; an equilibrium only needs neither to gain by switching alone.
Example: Both stores cutting prices is the Nash equilibrium, since neither can earn more by raising its price alone.
best response
The strategy giving a player the highest payoff, given the other player's chosen strategy.
Example: If Store B holds its price, Store A's best response is to cut, earning 7,000 dollars instead of 5,000.
prisoner's dilemma
A game where each player's dominant strategy leaves both worse off than cooperating would.
Loses the mark: “both players choose the best joint outcome”. In a prisoner's dilemma each player's own incentive pulls away from the best joint outcome.
Example: The two stores are in a prisoner's dilemma: each cuts prices, so both earn 4,000 dollars instead of the 5,000 each could earn by holding prices.
oligopoly
A market dominated by a few large firms with entry barriers, whose choices interact.
Loses the mark: “a few firms charge the monopoly price”. Oligopolists may compete prices down; the outcome depends on how they react to each other.
Example: The country's three mobile networks form an oligopoly, so each one's price cut forces the others to respond.
interdependence
The condition in which each oligopolist's best choice depends on what its rivals do.
Loses the mark: “each firm decides on its own”. An oligopolist's best price depends on its rivals' prices, so it cannot decide alone.
Example: Because of interdependence, the network must guess how its two rivals will react before launching a cheaper plan.
collusion
An agreement among firms to restrict output or fix prices for near-monopoly profit.
Loses the mark: “firms cooperate to help buyers”. Colluding firms cut output and raise prices, which hurts buyers.
Example: Through collusion the three networks could each hold prices high and split the monopoly profit.
cartel
A group of firms formally agreeing to act as one monopoly, setting total output.
Loses the mark: “cartels always collapse at once”. A cartel can last when cheating is easy to detect and punish.
Example: The cartel of cement makers set a quota for each member so their total output matched the monopoly quantity.
incentive to cheat
Each member can gain by producing more or pricing lower while others keep the deal.
Loses the mark: “the agreement is stable because every firm profits”. A shared profit does not hold the deal together when each firm gains more by breaking it.
Example: The incentive to cheat is strong: a member that secretly sells extra cement at just below the cartel price wins sales from the others.